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Two basic market designs are used for the trading of electricity in meshed electricity
networks with transmission constraints. Analytical results show that, in two-node net-
works, a market design integrating transmission and energy markets reduces the ability of
electricity generators to exercise market power, relative to a design with separated markets
for transmission and energy designs. In multi-node networks, countervailing eﬀects make
an analytic analysis diﬃcult.
We present a formulation of both market designs as an equilibrium problem with equilib-
rium constraints, and apply our model to a realistic node network for Belgium, Germany,
France and the Netherlands. We ﬁnd that the integrated market design results in lower
prices.
1 Introduction
In electricity markets with frequently constrained transmission lines, these constraints must be
explicitly addressed by the market design, in order to achieve eﬃcient dispatch and appropri-
1ate locational signals for investment, and reduce the ability of strategic generators to game
the system operator. We compare the two basic market designs that can be used to address
transmission constraints:
• Integrated Market Design: The integrated market design corresponds to market de-
signs such as market splitting, zonal pricing or nodal pricing, and is implemented in the
North East of the US (PJM, NY ISO, New England ISO) and Scandinavia (Nordpool).
A centralised system operator collects location-speciﬁc energy bids and then clears the
market for the entire region according to a well-deﬁned protocol. The allocation of trans-
mission rights is implicit. This ensures that diﬀerent locational markets are automatically
arbitraged and the network is used eﬃciently.
• Separated Market Design: The separated market design is currently implemented
between many Continental European markets. Physical transmission rights are auctioned
and traded separately from the energy markets. Physical transmission rights are deﬁned
between areas, and traders must own these rights if they want to schedule a transmission
between the areas.
In a competitive market without uncertainty, the integrated market approach will result in
the same generation dispatch and prices as with an approach based on centrally-allocated phys-
ical transmission rights. This follows because Bohn, Caramanis and Schweppe (1983) showed
that the methodology underlying integrated market prices (nodal prices) results in welfare-
maximising dispatch, and Chao and Peck (1996) proved that, in a competitive environment
without uncertainty, the physical-rights-based approach also results in a welfare-maximising
dispatch.
Unfortunately, few electricity markets are perfectly competitive, and therefore we assess
how both market designs perform if generators bid strategically.
Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2003) showed that endogenous and exogenous arbitrage - corre-
sponding to integrated and separated markets - are equivalent. However, their analysis is based
2on the following tacit assumption: strategic generators assume that transmission prices, de-
ﬁned as the price-diﬀerences between diﬀerent nodes, do not change in response to their output
decision.
As a result, the proﬁt-maximisation condition of strategic generators (ﬁrst order con-
dition) assumes that additional output would induce traders to buy additional transmission
rights (at the ﬁxed price) and export some of the output to other nodes even if constraints are
binding. Strategic generators decide on their output as though they were facing the demand-
responsiveness of the unconstrained network, and will therefore exercise less market power than
if they are aware of transmission constraints. This model approach therefore understates the
exercise of market power.
Analytical models show that, in a two-node network and in meshed networks with market
power at one node, integrating energy and transmission markets reduces prices and improves
welfare (see section 3.2). This can be explained by the following eﬀect: if transmission markets
are separated from energy markets, the allocation of transmission capacity in the network to
export to, or import from, speciﬁc regions is determined before the stage of the energy spot
market. The bids of generators to energy spot markets no longer change the allocated trans-
mission capacity. If transmission markets are integrated with the energy market, transmission
rights are allocated after the energy bids are submitted. The net trade ﬂows are responsive to
output changes of generators, net demand elasticity is increased and generators exercise less
market power.
In a three-node network, Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997) showed that, for an integrated
market design with a strategic generator producing at two nodes, an increase of output by
a generator at node A can lead to a decrease in the prices, and therefore revenues, of this
generator at node B. This shows that the integrated market design can also provide incentives
for generators to reduce output. In section 3.3, we construct a three-node example to show that
the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect: integrating energy and transmission markets can,
in theory, reduce welfare.
3To assess the relative importance of these two countervailing eﬀects in larger networks with
realistic parametrisation, we implement both market designs formulated in a numerical model
(see section 4). We chose the Benelux countries Belgium and the Netherlands, with a reduced
representation of the neighbouring states, Germany and France.
The models presented in this paper are of interest from two diﬀerent perspectives: from the
economic perspective, regulators are interested in the optimal choice for market design. The
ranking with regard to the behaviour in the presence of market power provides an argument in
favour of the integrated market design.
From the mathematical perspective, both market design implementations are Equilibrium
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), which are a recent ﬁeld of research.
Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997) were the ﬁrst to give an EPEC formulation of an integrated
market design. Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2000) calculate oligopolistic price equilibria, using
the supply functions of conjectural variation. Strategic generators can decide either on slope or
intersect of their bid functions for each location. The optimisation problem for each generator is
a two-stage game, in which the generator anticipates the Independent Strategic Operator’s (ISO)
social welfare-maximising market clearing. Our integrated market model is a Cournot Game
in accordance with Cardell, Hitt Hogan (1997), expanded by price-responsive fringe generators
and implicit transmission quantities.
Separated market designs have so far been modelled as mixed complementarity problems
(Hobbs et al. 2003). Due to the existence of price-responsive fringe, we expand the separated
market model to an EPEC.
The search for an equilibrium is carried out by solving the generators’ problems (which are
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints) sequentially, using the last bid of the
competitors as the input parameter.
42 Notation, Market Designs and Simplifying Assump-
tions
In the following section, we introduce the notation for the mathematical formulation of the
market design. Then we explain the features and diﬀerences in depth, and formulate the opti-
misation problems of the generators. Finally, we discuss the implications of additional features
in real-world markets.
2.1 Notation
We summarise all indices, parameters, variables and shadow prices in table 1. The last column
indicates whether the parameter/variable is used in the model for the integrated or separated
market design.
The network has I nodes i with M links m between these nodes. We model J strategic
generation companies j, which can control generation on one or several nodes of the network.
To allow for piecewise linear marginal cost-schemes, we split the cost-curves of generators
in L sections l with linear cost-segments. The strategic generator j bids in location i in the
cost-segment l the quantity si,j,l. The marginal cost-function for strategic generator j in i is
c0
j(sijl) = caijl + cbijlsijl, sijl ≤ capgijl. Likewise, to represent piecewise linear cost-schemes for
competitive generation, their cost-curves in each location are divided into K −1 linear sections
k = 2,...,K.
The linear demand-curve for each node i is included as a negative competitive supply-curve,
and is denoted by k = 1. The quantities of the demand and the competitive fringe at a ﬁxed
node are therefore qik with c(qi1,...,qiK) =
P
l aik+bikqik. For k > 1 we require 0 ≤ qik ≤ capdik
and for k = 1 0 ≥ qi1 ≥ capdi1.
Note that ai1 and bi1 the parameters of the linear demand function and the demand qi,1 are
always negative in our notation, while the fringe quantities qi,k, k ≥ 2 are positive. We use an





l step number strategic generator I,S
k step number net demand I,S
m line I,S
Parameter
caijl cost-curve intercept, node i, strategic generator j, section l I,S
cbijl cost-curve slope, node i, strategic generator j, section l I,S
capdik capacity limit fringe generator/demand node i I,S
capgijl capacity limit generator j, node i, section l I,S
aik bid curve intercept, node i, fringe generator/demand section k I,S
bik bid curve slope, node i, fringe generator/demand section k I,S
γi,m ﬂow from node i over link m to swing bus (node 1) I,S
capkm capacity link m I,S
σk σ1 = 1 and σk = −1 for k 6= 1 for I,S
the diﬀerent treatment of demand and competitive fringe.
Variables
si,j,l quantities strategic generator j, node i, section l I,S
qi,k quantity, consumer or fringe generator, node i. I,S
ti export quantity, node i S
Shadow Price Constraint
p Conservation constraint in swing bus I
pi Conservation constraint in each bus S
λi,k non-negative demand and fringe production I,S
µi,k upper bound for fringe capacity. I,S
ρi,m capacity constraint on line k I
δi,m capacity constraint on line k - inverse direction. I
62.2 Market Designs
For each market design, we give a short description of the timing of the market. Subsequently, we
translate this description into the optimisation problems that the diﬀerent market participants
must solve.
2.2.1 Separated Market Design
In period one, traders submit bids for transmission capacity to a transmission operator. As we
assume competitive traders, the auction design need not be speciﬁed. Furthermore, it suﬃces to
deﬁne transmission contracts to and from a swing bus, because any transmission in the network
is a combination of two such contracts. The transmission operator issues transmission contracts
to the traders to make most eﬃcient use of the network.
In period two, traders, strategic generators, fringe generators and demand-side submit bids
to the local energy market. Traders with transmission capacity can buy energy in the spot
market at one node and sell it at a diﬀerent node. Therefore, traders must submit bids to the
exporting and importing spot markets simultaneously, and a trader failing at one end of the
transaction is exposed to high imbalance fees. To avoid these imbalance fees, traders submit
price-independent bids to both markets (Neuhoﬀ, 2003). Traders do not receive additional in-
formation between period one and period two; therefore, we can assume that they will use all
the transmission capacity they bought in period one to trade in period two.
Traders in period one correctly anticipate the spot market outcomes for period two. This is
possible because of full information, no uncertainty and no mixed-strategy choices of strategic
generators in the separated market design (Neuhoﬀ, 2003), and the assumption of competitive
traders. Competitive traders pay an amount for transmission contracts which will be the price-
diﬀerence between the local spot markets. We can simplify the model by assuming that the
transmission operator directly allocates transmission capacity between the spot markets in a
7way that makes most eﬃcient use of the transmission capacity. If the bids that are submitted
to the spot market are competitive, this results in a welfare-maximising use of the transmission
capacity. Only the bids of competitive generation and demand are price-responsive, and both
types of bids are competitive. Therefore, we assume that the transmission operator maximises
social welfare taking bids by competitive generation and demand into account. (see also Smeers
and Wei, 1999).
To represent the appropriate timing of the markets as the transmission auction happens
before the energy spot market we must ensure that the allocation of transmission capacity by
the transmission operator is not aﬀected by changes in the bids of strategic generators. This
can be achieved by treating the transmission operator on the same decision-level as the Cournot
Game between strategic generators. This ensures that output-changes of strategic generators
during their individual Cournot optimisation will not result in changes of the transmission
allocation. Nevertheless, equilibrium is only reached once the transmission operator correctly
anticipates the output-choice of strategic generators.
Due to the capacity constraints on the competitive generators, the net demand - which
is demand minus competitive generation - is not diﬀerentiable at the points at which the ca-
pacity or non-negativity constraints become active. In the mathematical formulation, this is
represented by mixed complementarity constraints. The resulting optimisation problems for
the generators and the transmission operator are of the MPEC type. Furthermore, the non-
negativity constraints of competitive generation imply that the net demand functions are not
necessarily convex, and so the solution is not necessarily unique.
















k qik − ti = 0 (2)
aik + bikqik + pi + σkλik − σkµik = 0 (3)
σkqik ≥ 0 (4)
λik ≥ 0 (5)
8qi,kλik = 0 (6)
−σkqik + σkcapdik ≥ 0 (7)
µik ≥ 0 (8)
µik(−σkqik + σkCapdik) = 0 (9)
sijl ≥ 0 (10)
−sijl + capgijl ≥ 0 (11)
The co-ordinated auction determines the export quantity ti in order to maximise residual
social welfare (expenditure on electricity equals generators’ revenue plus transmission revenue













subject to the energy balance in the network (13) and at each individual node (14). Constraints
(15) are the market-clearing condition for competitive generation and demand with the non-
negativity (16) to (18) and capacity constraints (19) to (21). Constraints (22) to (23) are the
upper- and lower-line capacity constraints.
s.t.
P




k qik − ti = 0 (14)
aik + bikqik + pi + σkλik − σkµik = 0 (15)
σkqik ≥ 0 (16)
λik ≥ 0 (17)
qi,kλik = 0 (18)
−σkqik + σkcapdik ≥ 0 (19)
µik ≥ 0 (20)
µik(−σkqik + σkCapdik) = 0 (21)
Capkm −
P
i γm,iti ≥ 0 (22)
9P
i γm,iti + Capkm ≥ 0 (23)
The resulting problem is of the EPEC type, since the ISO and strategic generators share
the market-clearing conditions of demand and competitive fringe as common constraints.
2.2.2 Integrated Market Design
In the integrated market design, the timing is diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst stage, generators submit bids
to the ISO. The ISO’s objective, at the second stage, is to allocate transmission capacity, in order
that the network be used optimally. This can be achieved by maximising social welfare, using
demand and price responsive supply by competitive generators as variables. The optimisation
problem of the ISO contains the energy-conservation constraint, the capacity constraints of the











j sij + qik
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≤ capkm ρm,δm (26)
0 ≥ σkqik ≥ σkcapgik λik,µik (27)
This is a quadratic optimisation problem with a unique solution: if bik 6= 0.
The KKT-stationarity conditions of the ISO’s optimisation problem are:










k qik) = 0 (29)

















− Capkm⊥δm ≥ 0 (31)
σkqi,k ≥ 0 (32)
λik ≥ 0 (33)
qikλik = 0 (34)
−σkqikqik + σkcapgik ≥ 0 (35)
10µik ≥ 0 (36)
(−σkqikqik + σkcapgik)µik = 0 (37)
2.2.3 Formulation of the Leader’s Problem (Generator)
In the leader problem for the strategic generators, the quantity bids of their fellow strategic
generators are taken as ﬁxed. Leaders anticipate the ISO response to their quantity bid. This
is modelled by including the optimality conditions of the ISO’s problem as constraints in the
strategic generators’ optimisation problem. The strategic generators maximise proﬁts. Proﬁts
consist of electricity sales at his nodes of production minus production costs. The ﬁrst 10 con-
straints are the KKT conditions of the ISO optimisation problem; the remaining two constraints






























k qik) = 0 (40)

















− Capkm⊥δm ≥ 0 (42)
σkqi,k ≥ 0 (43)
λik ≥ 0 (44)
qikλik = 0 (45)
−σkqik + σkcapgik ≥ 0 (46)
µik ≥ 0 (47)
(−σkqik + σkcapgik)µik = 0 (48)
sijl ≥ 0 (49)
sijl ≤ capgijl (50)
Note that electricity prices are calculated as nodal prices where the multiplier p of the
11energy-conservation constraint determines the price at the swing bus.
2.3 Institutional Assumptions
As with all models, we must abstract certain features from real-market designs.
The two major simpliﬁcations in our analysis are that we do not represent the market-power
mitigating impact of, ﬁrst, long-term energy and, second, long-term transmission contracts. It
is easy to represent the impact of an exogenously-determined allocation of such contracts in our
model, but it would require a more simpliﬁed representation of the transmission market if we
were to represent an endogenous transmission or energy-contract allocation.
First, electricity generators sign long-term contracts, either in the form of explicit contracts
with large customers or implicit contracts due to their vertical integration with the supply
business. Exposure to the spot market is reduced thanks to these long-term contracts, and
strategic generators face less incentive to exercise market power (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Not
representing these contracts implies that we will observe higher prices than usually realised, but
as we are interested in comparing the price-levels between two market designs, and both designs
are equally aﬀected, this does not impact on our analysis.
Second, electricity generators frequently acquire and own transmission contracts in order
to hedge their transmission risk. The model with separated energy and transmission markets
does include transmission contracts, but strategic generators are, in the model, excluded from
participating in this contract market. Therefore, the model ignores the impact which contract
ownership has on the bids of strategic generators (Joskow and Tirole, 2000) or the distortions to
the contract auctions due to strategic bidding for contracts by generators (Gilbert et.al., 2004).
In reality, transmission contracts are not only part of separate energy and transmission
market designs, but also part of integrated energy and transmission markets. They are equally
required in an integrated market design, but this time as ﬁnancial contracts, to allow market
participants to hedge the base risk and to provide forward information for investment decisions.
Ownership of ﬁnancial transmission contracts distorts the dispatch decisions of strategic gen-
12erators just as ownership of physical transmission contracts does, and bids for these contracts
will likewise be aﬀected. Therefore, we simplify both market designs in a symmetric way, by
excluding generators from holding transmission contracts in either design.
A further aspect that impacts the exercise of market power is the regulatory threat. Mo-
nopolists anticipate regulatory intervention if they charge excessive prices and will therefore
moderate their behaviour (for a modelling approach, see Neuhoﬀ and Newbery, 2004).
One requirement for the application of our modelling approach is that physical transmission
contracts are only traded at discrete points in time. In meshed networks, it is unlikely that any
other design can be implemented, because any physical transmission right (point-to-point) is
an aggregation of property rights to a multitude of potentially constrained transmission lines
(ﬂow-gate rights). All market participants must simultaneously state their willingness to pay for
diﬀerent transmission rights, to allow the system operator to eﬃciently aggregate the ﬂow-gate
rights into the transmission contracts.
Transmission contracts were traded continuously and simultaneously with energy contracts
in the markets along the west coast of the US. However, this was only possible because physical
transmission contracts directly corresponded to an access right to the constrained link of an
almost linear system stretching from Canada down to California. Therefore no (re-) conﬁgura-
tion of transmission contracts based on market information is required. This approach does not
work in meshed networks such as in the US North-East or Continental Europe.
In Continental Europe, transmission rights for interconnections between diﬀerent countries
are still auctioned separately. This is known to be very ineﬃcient, because only a fraction
of physically-available transmission capacity can be provided to ensure that system security is
preserved, irrespective of the loop ﬂows created by other transmissions. This is the reason for
recent eﬀorts to combine these individual auctions. This paper was motivated by the question
of what is the best way to combine these individual auctions.
Integrated markets can be more complex than those represented in our model. New York
and New England have an integrated energy and transmission market that also includes marginal
13loss calculations. Furthermore, like PJM and Nordpool, they have a multi-settlement system
with an integrated day-ahead and balancing market. The possibility of implementing these
additional features in a consistent way can be seen as an additional beneﬁt of an integrated
market design. We believe that abstracting from these eﬀects should in ﬁrst order not distort
this analysis, but we are excited to see, and are working on expanding our analysis to include
question of, balancing markets, transmission contracts and forward contracting (see e.g. Kamat
and Oren, 2003).
Also related is the debate on nodal versus zonal pricing. In separated energy and trans-
mission markets as well as in integrated markets, the aggregation of individual nodes to zones
either requires a more conservative deﬁnition of transmission capacity or increases the opportu-
nity for generators to exercise market power (Harvey and Hogan, 2000); aggregation results in
ineﬃcient dispatch and causes generators to make incorrect location decisions. The comparison
of integrated and separated markets in this paper is based on the same level of aggregation in
both designs.
Note that, for the integrated energy and transmission markets, a shift to smaller zones
or nodes is feasible. The only drawback is that generators are exposed to some basis risk if
transmission contracts do not exactly match their scheduled ﬂows. A design with separate
energy and transmission rights is more aﬀected. Liquidity is lost at each node and transmission
contracts become more complex.
3 Illustrative Examples to Provide Economic Insight
In this section, we construct two stylised network examples, for which we calculate the results
with a separate and integrated market design, to illustrate the countervailing eﬀects.
143.1 A Three-Node Network
In this three-node network, only the transmission line between node 1 and 3 is constrained
and of capacity capk. According to Kirchhofs Laws ﬂows are split between all feasible paths
proportional to the inverse of the resistance on these paths. Therefore, γ1 = 2
3 of the energy
ﬂowing from node 1 to node 3 crosses the constrained link. Likewise, γ2 = 1
3 of exports t2 from
node 2 to node 3.
For energy delivery from node 1 to node 3, the direct link is half the distance of the path
via node 2. Therefore, physical laws imply that two-thirds of the energy pass along the direct
path. The joint exports from 1 and 2 are constrained as follows:
γ1t1 + γ2t2 ≤ capk. (51)
Net production at each node i is qi and positive for exports and negative for imports. The
net-demand-curve is assumed to be linear:
pi = −ai − biqi (Note that ai,bi,qi ≤ 0.) (52)
In example one (two), one strategic generator with output s2 (s1,s2) is located at node









Figure 1: Example One: The monopolist











Figure 2: Example Two: The monopolist
has generation at nodes 1 and 2
15illustrative example, we also assume a linear cost-function and no fringe generators; therefore
we also omit the indices l and k.
3.2 Example 1
The ﬁrst example shows how, in a three-node network, the integration of energy and transmission
markets can mitigate market power.
3.2.1 Separated Energy and Transmission Markets
In period one, traders submit bids for transmission capacity to the system operator. As argued
in section 2.2.1, competitive traders can be represented by the welfare-maximising transmission
operator, allocating transmission capacity ti(s2) and choosing output and demand quantities
qi(s2). We do not represent the output choice of the strategic generator in period two s2
as an endogenous variable for the transmission operator because that would imply that the
transmission operator allocates transmission capacity in order to inﬂuence the output choice of
strategic generators. However, the competitive traders implementing the welfare-maximisation
(53) do not take such considerations into account. We therefore set s2 as ﬁxed in (53) to (56)
and calculate the equilibrium output choice of strategic generators in (57) to (59). The objective















i + aiqi. (53)
subject to the network energy balance:
X
i
ti(s2) = 0, (54)
the local energy balance:
q2(s2) + s2 = t2(s2), qi(s2) = ti(s2),i = 1,3 (55)
and the transmission constraint (51).
16For simplicity, we assume that the transmission constraint is binding, so we are able to
use the equality sign in (51). We also assume that capacity and non-negativity constraints are
satisﬁed. Using (55) to eliminate ti(s2) in (54) and (51) q1(s2) and q3(s2) can be written as
function of q2(s2):
q1(s2) =




−capk + (γ2 − γ1)(q2(s2) + s2)
γ1
,
allowing us to express the optimisation problem (53) as a function of the remaining choice
variable q2(s2) (note that all the ai and bi are negative). To simplify the calculations, we















−capk + (γ2 − γ1)(q2(s2) + s2)
γ1
.
For b1 < 0 this is a concave function in q2(s2) with a unique maximum. The ﬁrst order condition










Substituting back into (55) gives the transmission capacity allocated to exports from node 2 as
a function of the expected output choice of the strategic generator:
t2(s2) = s2 + q2(s2) =
γ2b1capk + γ2
1b2s2 − γ2






When the strategic generator bids to the energy spot market in period two, the transmission
capacity t2 allocated for exports from the node has already been decided in period one. The
strategic generator takes ti as ﬁxed in his maximisation problem for the bid to the energy spot
market in period two:
Π = max
s2,q2,p2 p2s2, (57)
subject to the local energy balance (55) and the competitive bids of local net demand (52). The
two constraints allow the expression of the two choice variables q2 and p2 as a function of s2, in
17such a way that the optimisation problem reads:
Π = max









In equilibrium, traders, and therefore the transmission operator maximising (53), correctly
anticipate the output choice s2 of the strategic generator in the transmission auction. This
implies that (56) and (59) must be simultaneously satisﬁed. This gives us the equilibrium











3.2.2 Integrated Energy and Transmission Markets
The integrated energy and transmission market corresponds to a Stackelberg Game (Hobbs et
al., 2000). Each leader (generator) continues to maximie his proﬁt function (58) subject to local
energy balance (55) and competitive local demand response (52). The diﬀerence is that ti are
no longer ﬁxed but determined by the follower (system operator) as a function of the strategic
output choice of the generator s2.
We have already solved the followers’ reaction function t2(s2) and determined the optimal
allocation of transmission rights as a function of s2 in equation (56). Therefore, we need only




























The nominator in (62) and (60) is identical, but the denominator is larger in (60).
This shows that the production of the strategic generator is larger in the integrated market
design. The generator no longer faces only local demand response, but also the response of the
18network. To calculate this demand slope, we diﬀerentiate the price at node 2, as expressed in















provided b1,b2 < 0. Integrating the energy and transmission markets implies that prices change
less with output changes, or that eﬀective demand is more responsive to price-changes. Higher
eﬀective demand elasticity is the main driver in mitigating market power and can be obtained
at low cost by choosing the appropriate integrated market design.
Parameters a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 capk
Values 0 −8 −10 −2 −1 0 5
variables s2 q1 q2 q3 p1 p2 p3
Separated market design 8.25 3.25 0.25 −11.75 6.5 8.25 10
Integrated market design 16.5 0.5 −2.5 −14.5 1 5.5 10
The generators proﬁt increases from 68.1 to 90.8 and the social welfare from 104.9 to 161.6 if
we change from a separated to an integrated market design.
3.3 Example 2
The second example illustrates that the reverse eﬀect is also possible, if one strategic generator
is active in more than one node. We assume that the strategic generator is active at nodes 1
and 2 , see ﬁgure 2. The set-up is essentially the same as in example one, with the diﬀerence
non-zero marginal costs of production at node 2. The results of a numerical calculation are:
Parameters a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 capk cb2
Values 0 −40 −80 −4 −1 −1 5 3
variables s1 s2 q1 q2 q3 p1 p2 p3
Separated market design 1.86 9.52 1.86 −1.94 −12.35 7.42 38.07 68.71
Integrated market design 0.15 10.89 2.5 −1.18 −11.29 10 38.82 67.65
In this example, the price-increases at two nodes and decreases at one node if we change from the
19separated to the integrated market design. More importantly, while the proﬁt of the strategic
generator increases (from 240.2 to 246.3) the total welfare decreases from 772.3 to 768.2.
4 Set-up of the Comparison
The network consists of three nodes in the Netherlands, two nodes in Belgium and one node
each in Germany and France, with generation and demand. Further intermediate nodes with
neither demand nor generation are used to model the linearised DC network. The transmission
constraints were summarised as 28 ﬂow-gates. All ﬂow-gates are characterised by an upper limit
in MWh, and by power distribution functions characterising the amount of energy transmitted
to each node from the reference node Germany, passing via the ﬂow-gate.
For generation capacity, eight ﬁrms were considered as strategic generators, with produc-
tion in one or several countries. Production in Belgium and the Netherlands is divided between
the countries nodes according to the location of the generation plants. In Germany and France,
production and demand are located at the national nodes D and F.
Country Node Generator




Netherlands Maas Essent, Nuon, E.ON, Electrabel
Krim Essent, Nuon, E.ON, Electrabel
Zwol Electrabel
We assume that all these ﬁrms are bidding their entire output in the spot market, with the
sole objective of maximising proﬁt. As discussed in section 2.3, we ignore the impact of forward
contracts and regulatory threat, and therefore model higher prices than those observed. The
remaining generation plants, which are not allocated to one of the mentioned companies, are
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Figure 4: Load Scenarios
To create several diﬀerent demand scenarios, empirical load data for the summer and winter
peak are used and scaled with a scenario and location-speciﬁc random factor. With this method,
we created ten diﬀerent demand scenarios, ﬁve for summer and ﬁve for a winter generation
structure. Figure 4 shows the demand levels at 30 Euro/MWh. We assume that demand
is linear. To determine the slope, we assume that demand elasticity is 0.1 at the previously
calculated demand for a price of 30 Euro/MWh.
All parameters can be found on the following website provided by ECN:
http://www.electricitymarkets.info/modelcomp/testdata.html
With these parameter values, we solve the equilibrium problems described in section two.
5 Numerical Issues
Both market designs lead to Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints, which are a
special case of a generalised Nash Game (GN). Calculating Nash equilibria for EPECs is diﬃcult
for several reasons: If solving for pure strategies, a solution does not necessarily exist (Oren,
211997 ). Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000) have calculated mixed strategy equilibria for a
simple network. However, in complex games mixed strategy equilibria are diﬃcult to calculate.
If pure strategy solutions exist, then they are usually not unique since the proﬁt functions of
the generators are nonlinear and non-diﬀerentiable. Additionally, Harker (1991) and Ehrenmann
(2003) showed that GN-games can have non-isolated, multiple solutions (solution sets) which
makes a local convergence analysis diﬃcult.
We implement the diﬀerent market designs in the modeling package GAMS and search for
strategy tuples that fulﬁll the stationarity conditions for all generators using diﬀerent starting
points.
We follow the diagonalisation approach of Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2000) which is similar
to a Gauss-Seidel algorithm. We solve the optimisation problem of each generator sequentially
holding the decisions of the other generators ﬁxed and hope that the sequence converges (inte-
grated market). In the separate market design, the co-ordinated auction becomes an additional
step in the diagonalisation sequence. The optimisation problems of the generators are of the
MPEC type. Since the linear independence constraint qualiﬁcation (LICQ) is always violated
for MPECs, they are already computationally challenging .
To solve the MPECs we used classical NLP solvers: Fletcher and Leyﬀer (2002) reported
that they had successfully applied SQP methods on a non-linear program (NLP) reformulation
of the original MPEC. In this NLP reformulation, they replaced the complementarity constraints
0 ≤ f(z)⊥g(z) ≥ 0
with
f(z) ≥ 0,g(z) ≥ 0,f(z)
>g(z) ≤ 0.
The advantage of such a formulation is, that the multiplier of the complementarity is sign
constraint. Fletcher, Leyﬀer, Ralph and Scholtes examined the local convergence properties and
showed that, under reasonable assumptions, SQP converges locally superlinearly near a strong
stationary point for such a MPEC reformulation. Under the generic MPEC-LICQ (Scholtes and
St¨ ohr, 2001), a B-stationary point (Scheel and Scholtes, 2000) of the original MPEC is a strong
22stationary point of the corresponding NLP. We used the standard SQP algorithms SNOPT (Gill,
Murray and Saunders, 2002) and switched to PATHNLP (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) to solve the
reformulated MPECs after a ﬁxed number of iterations. PATHNLP performed better because
SNOPT stopped frequently at non-optimal intermediate solutions.
Each NLP has around 150 variables and 500 constraints (140 complementarity constraints).
We initialise the problem by solving the ISO (follower) problem for ﬁxed initial proportions of
each strategic generators installed production capacity. We used levels of 20%, 30%, 40% ...
110%, 120% of the installed capacity of the ﬁrst segment of each generator as starting points.
Additional, we used the solution of the integrated market model as a starting point for the
separated market model, and then again the solution of the separated market model as a starting
point for the integrated market model. The computability of an equilibrium was sensitive to
the choice of starting point.
6 Findings
For the separated market design, we always found solutions for all 10 scenarios. For the inte-
grated market approach, the diagonalisation converged for six scenarios. For two scenarios the
diagonalisation did not converge but created a sequence of prices with deviations of less than
10−5%. In two case the sequence cycled with variations of up to 5%.
Also for several scenarios, we found several diﬀerent equilibria and made the following
observations:
• All solutions that we found for the integrated market led to lower prices in all nodes than
in the separated design with one exception where the price increased in one node by 2%
while the average prices fell by 28%.
• In the cases of cycling, all prices of the sequence generated for the integrated market were
below the prices of the separated market.
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Figure 5: Price-Levels for the Separated and 2 equilibria of for the Integrated Market Design
(Euro/MWh)
Here we found two equilibria for the integrated market design. The prices calculated for France
are higher than in the other zones, which is due to EdF’s monopoly position and binding import
constraints from both Germany and Belgium. As discussed above, we did not model the fact
that, in reality, a dominant national generator could not increase the price to the calculated
level without triggering strong regulatory interference. By contrast, Germany has the lowest
price-levels, since it has four strategic generators and a large share of competitive generation,
which provides considerable responsiveness in net demand.
In our examples, prices are always higher in a separated market design. The lowest impact
of integrating energy and transmission market is on price-levels in France, because transmission
constraints are binding from both neighbouring countries represented in our model: Germany
and Belgium. The ﬂexibility of allocating transmission capacity provided by the integrated
market design only allows limited readjustment and therefore only little additional demand
responsiveness. By contrast, the nodes in the Benelux countries have signiﬁcantly reduced
prices because they are located in the middle of a meshed network.




















Figure 6: Convergence of the Diagonalisation
approach, generators compete in small markets. In the integrated market approach, the higher
zonal resolution has less negative impact.
The output ﬁle with prices for all scenarios, quantities for the strategic and fringe generators
can be found at:
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/rersearch/comparison/results cam.xls
7 Conclusion
Two basic types of market design exist for the allocation of transmission capacity in meshed
electricity networks. In the separated energy and transmission market, physical transmission
rights are allocated in a co-ordinated auction. Trading electric energy between regions requires
the ownership of transmission rights.
In the integrated energy and transmission market, energy is traded locally and a system
operator schedules energy ﬂows between regions. Financial transmission contracts allow for
long-term hedging to facilitate trading between regions.
In competitive markets without uncertainty, both designs produce identical market out-
25comes. If generators act strategically, integration of energy and transmission markets eﬀectively
induces demand elasticity, since generators anticipate the impact of their bid on transmission.
This should reduce the ability of strategic generators to exercise market power, and should there-
fore reduce prices. However, if companies own generation facilities at several nodes, integration
also provides an incentive to increase the exercise of market power. The balance of these ef-
fects could not be determined analytically for realistic networks. We therefore implemented the
two-market designs as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints in the modelling
package GAMS. We applied our models to data representing the Benelux situation. Comparing
the resulting prices, we observed that the eﬀect of importing net demand elasticity dominates
and that prices were always lower in our test scenarios in the integrated market design. So far,
we have only ensured that bidding strategies of generators are stationary points, but have not
examined whether ﬁnite deviations are proﬁtable.
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